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Michela Massimi
Laws of Nature and Nomic Necessity
Was Kant Really a Projectivist?
What did Kant have to say about the lawfulness of nature and the necessity that
seemingly goes with our nomic judgments? Like Hume before him, the Critical
Kant too saw the necessity of our nomic judgments as originating somehow in
our mind, or better in the faculty of understanding. Yet a gulf separates Kant
from Hume. For Kant’s mature view about the lawfulness of nature and the abil-
ity of our faculty of understanding to prescribe laws to nature brings the discus-
sion about the necessity of our nomic judgments onto an entirely new realm, un-
known to his predecessors and hardly acknowledged by contemporary
philosophers of science, whose debates on nomic necessity have been polarized
between Humeans and Necessitarians.
In this essay, I clarify the nature of the prescribing force that the Critical Kant
assigned to the faculty of understanding in explaining nature’s lawfulness and
the modal necessity that accompanies such move. Most importantly, I clarify
what Kant did not subscribe to. For there is a widespread and tempting view
that for long time has interpreted Kant’s view on the lawfulness of nature
along projectivist lines. I explain why in my view Kant’s bold claim about the un-
derstanding prescribing laws to nature should not be understood along the lines
of a form of projectivism about laws.
1 Nomic judgments, Second Analogy, and nomic
necessity in general
In this Section, I investigate Kant’s mature view about the lawfulness of nature
and take some preliminary steps towards answering the key question about the
necessity of the laws of nature, according to Kant. More to the point, my goal
here is to raise some questions about an influential but, in my view, ultimately
incorrect interpretation of Kant’s view that takes the form of projectivism.¹
 I have discussed and analysed what I take to be Kant’s positive view on the lawfulness of na-
ture in Massimi, Michela: Prescribing Laws to Nature. Part I. Newton, the pre-Critical Kant, and
three problems about the lawfulness of nature. In: Kant-Studien 105/4 (2014), 491–508. And
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That Kant understood nomic judgments as bringing along with them a kind
of necessity that goes over and above mere Humean co-occurrence of events is
clear from textual evidence. Take a simple mundane nomic judgment such as
“Loadstones attract iron filings”, and consider the counterfactual conditional
“If a loadstone had been present, the iron filings would have been attracted”.
On a non-sophisticated Humean reading, this counterfactual would simply ex-
press the constant conjunction between the event A (i.e. the loadstone being
present) and event B (i.e. iron filings being attracted to it), the fact that A pre-
cedes B in time and is contiguous to it in space, but with no causal glue in nature
connecting events of type B with events of type A.
On a non-sophisticated Humean reading,² all we would be entitled to say is
that the impression (and idea) of event A is always followed by the impression
(and idea) of event B. Of course, such Humean reading presupposes our ability to
have impressions, and form ideas, of both events A and B. Hence, the famous
objection against the naïve Humean regularity theory of laws: namely, that it
cannot account for uninstantiated laws such as Newton’s first law, for example
(i.e. “If no force acts on a material body, the body persists in its state of rest or
uniform motion”, whereby the antecedent is typically uninstantiated in nature,
and can only be observed in a lab under suitable conditions).
Kant’s view fares better than the non-sophisticated Humean view on this
score. For Kant can eschew the objection about uninstantiated laws by conced-
ing upfront that nomic judgments such as “Loadstones attract iron filings” go
beyond the (past, present, and future) co-occurrences of two perceived /perceiv-
able events, and involve instead unobservable causal entities (e.g. a “magnetic
matter” as he calls it). Indeed, for Kant it is this unobservable causal entity
that connects the two events and acts as causal glue between them, even if
our senses are not fine enough to discern it. This is what Kant says in the Ana-
lytic of Principles under the Section on The Postulates of Empirical Thinking in
General:
However, one can also cognize the existence of a thing prior to the perception of it, and
therefore cognize it comparatively a priori, if only it is connected with some perceptions
in accordance with the principles of their empirical connection (the analogies). For in
that case, the existence of the thing is still connected with our perceptions in a possible
also in Massimi, Michela: Grounds, modality, and nomic necessity in the Critical Kant. In: Kant
and the Laws of Nature. Ed. Michela Massimi, Angela Breitenbach. Cambridge 2017, 150– 170.
This essay should then be read in conjunction with, and as complementary to the positive anal-
yses I have already offered in these other two articles.
 This contrast with sophisticated Humean readings of laws of nature as in David, Lewis: Coun-
terfactuals. Oxford 1973.
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experience, and with the guidance of the analogies we can get from our actual perceptions
to the thing in the series of possible perceptions. Thus we cognize the existence of a mag-
netic matter penetrating all bodies from the perception of attracted iron filings, although an
immediate perception of this matter is impossible for us given the constitution of our or-
gans. […] Thus wherever perception and whatever is appended to it in accordance with em-
pirical laws reaches, there too reaches our cognition of the existence of things.³
Kant seems to suggest that our cognition of the existence of things (including un-
observable entities such as “magnetic matter”, or else) is made possible (despite
our finite limited sensory organs) through the guidance of the Analogies of Ex-
perience; in particular through what he calls the “empirical laws” (e.g. the
laws of magnetism) that may instantiate the Second Analogy of Experience (cau-
sality), for example. Going against a well-trodden Humean tradition that had
long warned against taking causal laws as a reliable guide to what there is,
Kant seems to be reverting the trend. For he takes the Second Analogy of Expe-
rience as a principle that guides our possible experience, our ability to start with
perceptions and then make inferences about the existence of things, including
unobservable ones, at work in the lawful empirical connection of appearances.
But there is more.
Existential claims about unobservable entities afforded by the Second Anal-
ogy – Kant clarifies a few pages later – do not carry the mark of the “merely for-
mal and logical necessity in the connection of concepts”. Our ability to infer the
existence of “magnetic matter” is not, for Kant, downstream of our concept of
loadstone, or of the logical connection between the concept of loadstone and
the concept of iron filings that we might have in our mind. Existential claims
carry instead the mark of “material necessity in existence”, which was shunned
by Hume.With an important caveat, though. Namely, that Kant (like Hume before
him) is not arguing for the necessity of the existence of any particular substance
tout court. Rather, he is arguing for the material necessity in the relation between
causes and effects in nature. Or better, he is arguing for the necessity through
which once we posit the existence of something qua cause, the existence of
something else qua effect necessarily follows. Had the loadstone been present,
the iron filings would necessarily have been attracted by it:
Now there is no existence that could be cognized as necessary under the condition of other
given appearances except the existence of effects from given causes in accordance with laws
of causality. Thus, it is not the existence of things (substances) but of their state of which
alone we can cognize the necessity, and moreover only from other states,which are given in
perception, in accordance with empirical laws of causality. […] Hence we cognize only the
 Kant: KrV, B 273/A 226, emphasis added.
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necessity of effects in nature, the causes of which are given to us, and the mark of necessity
in existence does not reach beyond the field of possible experience […]. Necessity therefore
concerns only the relations of appearances in accordance with the dynamical law of cau-
sality, and the possibility grounded upon it of inferring a priori some given existence (a
cause) to another existence (the effect).⁴
It is clear from this passage how Kant regarded the cause–effect relation ex-
pressed by the Second Analogy of Experience as bringing along with it a
“mark of necessity”. Kant regarded existential claims from something qua
cause to something else qua effect as necessary because conforming to the “em-
pirical laws of causality”. These in turn conformed to the “dynamical law of cau-
sality” (i.e., the Second Analogy) as a template for possible experience, i.e. for
our ability to infer from the existence of something as a cause to the existence of
something else as its effect. The only necessity we have knowledge of, then, is
the necessity that pertains not to substances qua noumena, but to phenomena
qua appearances in their lawful, thoroughgoing empirical connections expressed
by causal laws.⁵ Here we encounter what I take to be Kant’s general notion of
nomic necessity as capturing connections between appearances according to em-
pirical causal laws (be it the law of magnetism, or else). In contemporary lan-
guage, nomic judgments capture counterfactual conditionals of the form “if C
had been the case, E would have been the case” because, for Kant, necessity per-
tains – broadly speaking – to the way in which the Second Analogy guides us in
the lawful, thoroughgoing empirical connection of particular appearances to
make experience of nature possible for us.
Thus, Kant’s general notion of nomic necessity is strictly related to (and an
expression of) his overall take on modality in the Postulates of Empirical Think-
ing in General. In particular, his general notion of nomic necessity captures the
way in which the Postulates operate with respect to the Analogies to make expe-
rience of nature possible for us. The principles of modality – Kant makes it clear
– “do not in the least augment the concept of which they are asserted in such a
way as to add something to the representation of the object”.⁶ Instead, they “add
to the concept of a thing (the real), about which they do not otherwise say any-
thing, the cognitive power whence it arises and has its seat so that […] if it is de-
 Kant: KrV, A 227/B 280–A 228, emphases in italics added.
 For a discussion of necessity and the Postulates in relation to Kant’s Refutation of Idealism
and the distinction between noumena and phenomena, please see Emundts, Dina: The Refuta-
tion of Idealism and the Distinction between Phenomena and Noumena. In: The Cambridge Com-
panion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Ed. Paul Guyer. Cambridge 2010, 168– 189.
 Kant: KrV, B 286/A 234.
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termined through the connection of perceptions in accordance with concepts,
then the object is called necessary. The principles of modality therefore do not
assert of a concept anything other than the action of the cognitive faculty
through which it is generated”.⁷ The modal notion of necessity, Kant clarifies,
does not add anything to the concept of which it is asserted (e.g. the concept
of a thing qua effect). Instead it simply adds “the cognitive power whence it arises
and has its seat, so that, if it is merely connected in the understanding with the
formal conditions of experience, its object is called possible; if it is in connection
with perception […] and through this determined by means of the understanding,
then the object is actual; and if it is determined through the connection of per-
ceptions in accordance with concepts, then the object is called necessary”.⁸
An object (qua effect) is then for Kant necessary whenever it is determined
through the empirical connection of perceptions in accordance with causality,
for example.Were a loadstone present, iron filings would necessarily be attracted
by it, because our faculty of understanding determines thus-and-so the empirical
connection from our perception of the loadstone to the inferential conclusion
that iron filings would be moved (and necessarily so). Hence, Kant’s general no-
tion of nomic necessity finds home in the general conditions of the possibility of
experience laid down by the System of the Principles of Pure Understanding. The
lawfulness of nature, in this general broad sense, is nothing but the ability of our
faculty of understanding to connect appearances in determinate ways in accord-
ance with principles of the understanding (for example, in accordance with
causal concepts). The necessity captured by empirical laws of nature flows
from the necessity with which the understanding determines the thoroughgoing
connection of appearances in accordance with the Second Analogy of Experi-
ence, for example.
When stated thus and so, it would seem that Kant’s general notion of nomic
necessity does not differ much, after all, from Hume’s take on the necessity of
the causal connection. In Hume, necessity arises by habit and custom in the
human mind that has been exposed several times to the same co-occurrences
of events of the same type. In Kant too, it would seem, necessity is borne out
of “the cognitive power whence it arises and has its seat”, in particular our faculty
of understanding with its Principles (the Second Analogy of Experience in par-
ticular, and the Postulates of Empirical Thinking in General), and their ability
to determine the empirical connection of perceptions in specific a priori ways
(e.g. the ability to determine how the perception of something qua cause is
 Kant: KrV, A 234/B 287, emphases in italics added.
 Kant: KrV, A 234, emphases in italics added.
Laws of Nature and Nomic Necessity 401
 
bound to be followed by the perception of something else qua effect, so that
whenever we perceive an event A our faculty of understanding is able to infer
the necessary occurrence of event B, according to causality).
Yet, Kant could not be more at variance from Hume on this issue. For the
determination of the connection between perceptions in accordance with con-
cepts is in no way akin to the Humean constant conjunction, precedence, and
contiguity of impressions (and ideas) of type A with impressions (and ideas)
of type B. In knowing a specific spatio-temporal manifold according to cause–ef-
fect concepts (e.g. loadstone–iron filings), the faculty of understanding is al-
ready going beyond the sheer Humean principle of association of ideas. The fac-
ulty of understanding with its concepts, Kant tells us, is instead prescribing laws
to nature itself.⁹ The cause–effect connection and the necessity that goes with it
in nomic judgments is not confined to the way in which perceptions get associ-
ated by the human mind,as in Hume. Instead, it has a purchase on nature itself.
To put it bluntly, it is not the sheer Humean associative mechanism of our mind
to think of event A as a cause of event B that underlies Kant’s analysis of nomic
judgements and nomic necessity in this general sense. It is instead our antece-
dently-held belief that a determinate causal connection exists between event A
and event B that allows us to infer that B would occur (and necessarily so,
e.g. iron filings being attracted), were A to occur (e.g. were the loadstone pres-
ent).
The obvious problem with this way of marking the distinction between Kant
and Hume is that Kant (but not Hume) needs to tell then a story about what
might take us from an antecedently-held belief about causality (e.g. that A caus-
es B) to claims about nature itself (i.e. about a specific effect B occurring, and
necessarily so, were A to occur). In other words, the burden is on Kant (but
not on Hume) to demonstrate that nomic necessity – in this general sense,
which finds home in the System of the Principles of Pure Understanding – has
indeed a purchase on nature itself. I call this the Kantian problem of inference
(to distinguish it from the cognate version of the problem that can be found in
contemporary philosophy of science surrounding the necessity of laws in Arm-
strong’s Necessitarian account). And it is to the Kantian problem of inference
that I turn my attention next.
 Kant: KrV, B 163.
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2 The Kantian problem of inference
Before the aforementioned passages on the Postulates of Empirical Thinking in
General in the Analytic of Principles, Kant had dealt with the Transcendental De-
duction of the pure concepts of the understanding. It is in this context that Kant
famously introduced his claim about the categories being concepts that prescribe
laws a priori to nature “as the sum total of all appearances (natura materialiter
spectata)”.¹⁰ Kant then presents what he calls “a riddle” (I am henceforth going
to call it the Kantian problem of inference).¹¹ Namely, why must nature follow the
a priori laws that the understanding prescribe to it? And how could nature pos-
sibly do so? Since the categories are not themselves derived from nature, nor do
they follow nature’s patterns (otherwise they would be empirical and not a pri-
ori), how can they have any purchase on nature itself? I take the Kantian prob-
lem of inference to take the following form:
(I) All alterations occur in accordance with the law of the connection
of cause and effect (Second Analogy)
(II) Event of type A (e.g. presence of a loadstone) causes event of
type B (e.g. iron filings being attracted to it – empirical causal
law)
(III) Event A1 causes event B1 (e.g. this particular loadstone causes
these particular iron filings being attracted – instantiated empiri-
cal causal law)
(IV) A1 occurs
 Kant: KrV, B 163.
 The terminology “problem of inference” is coined by Bas van Fraassen in his critical treat-
ment of David Armstrong’s Necessitarian account of laws (van Fraassen, Bas: Laws and Symme-
try. Oxford 1989, 96). The problem of inference is the problem of how to move from a necessita-
tion relation between universal properties such as N (F-ness, G-ness) to the necessitation relation
that is supposed to hold at the level of particulars N (Fa, Ga). I borrow the terminology, although
it should be clear from the passage below that the Kantian version of the problem of inference
concerns how to go from a kind of necessity captured by the Postulates in their determination of
the connection of appearances according to the Second Analogy, to the necessity that is sup-
posed to hold in nature between events we come to know about via the Analogies and Postu-
lates. Thus, the Kantian problem of inference is even more pressing than its Armstrongian coun-
terpart because it is the problem of explaining how we infer about lawful events in nature, from
antecedently-held beliefs about the thoroughgoing connection of appearances in our faculty of
understanding.
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(V) B1 necessarily follows (necessity of effects, via I, II, and III).
The Kantian problem of inference is then the problem of explaining how to go
from pure principles of the understanding such as (I) to specific events in nature
(i.e. V) via type–token empirical causal laws (II and III).¹² Two preliminary re-
marks are in order.
First, please note that the conclusion of this inference (V) is not an expect-
ation that B1 will occur; but rather, the necessary occurrence of event B1 given the
occurrence of event A1 and empirical causal laws II and III. Note that Kant is not
saying that upon observing A1 the mind forms the expectation that B1 will occur.
He is making a stronger modal claim: namely that once A1 is posited, B1 neces-
sarily follows. Were the loadstone present, the iron filings would necessarily be
attracted by it. The occurrence of the effect is necessary – Kant argues – because
the causal connection between A1 and B1 conforms to the laws of the understand-
ing (I) and the way in which they modally determine the connection between ap-
pearances, i.e. the two events A and B (via empirical causal type-token laws II
and III). Should A1 occur, its effect B1 would necessarily follow, in accordance
with the law of causality. Kant can then claim that the necessity of the effect
is due to “the cognitive power whence it arises and has its seat”,¹³ namely the
faculty of understanding and its Principles (e.g. Second Analogy). It is via this
inference from (I) to (V) – I contend – that Kant argues that the categories are
concepts that prescribe laws a priori to nature.
Second, the passage from (I) to (II) should not be understood as a deduction.
Kant clarifies that
Particular laws, because they concern empirically determined appearances, cannot be com-
pletely derived from the categories, although they all stand under them. Experience must be
added in order to come to know particular laws at all; but about experience in general, and
about what can be cognized as an object of experience, only those a priori laws offer in-
struction.¹⁴
 I have discussed in detail the Kantian problem of inference in Massimi, Michela: Grounds,
modality, and nomic necessity in the Critical Kant. In: Kant and the Laws of Nature. Ed. Michela
Massimi, Angela Breitenbach. Cambridge 2017, which the interested reader is kindly referred to.
Here, I supplement my discussion of the problem with a critical analysis of a tempting (but in my
view ultimately incorrect) solution to the Kantian problem of inference.
 Kant: KrV, A 234.
 Kant: KrV, B 165.
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Empirical laws, and this particular causal law among them (II), cannot be de-
rived from the Second Analogy of Experience.¹⁵ Instead, as Kant puts it, empiri-
cal causal laws simply “stand under” the Second Analogy. I have suggested else-
where that we see (II) as an instantiation of the general cause-effect template
captured by the Second Analogy (I), pretty much as (III) is an instantiation of
(II), in turn. Experience plays a key role in our knowledge of these different in-
stantiations.We need sensory experience to ‘fill in’ the cause-effect template of-
fered by the Second Analogy in as many ways as there are empirical causal laws
that “stand under” the umbrella of the Second Analogy – be they laws of mag-
netism, laws of electricity, laws of mechanics, and so forth. The Second Analogy
would then provide the general template for thinking of events as causally con-
nected, under which stand many empirical causal connections instantiated by
particular causal laws, which in turn find their instantiatiation in token occur-
rences in nature.
However, the problem of how to interpret this overall inference and Kant’s
puzzling claim that the understanding prescribes laws a priori to nature remains.
What remains puzzling is the heterogeneity between the premises (I–III) and the
conclusion (V). For (V) is a claim about nature and the necessity of effects in na-
ture,whereas (I–III) are claims about an a priori principle of the faculty of under-
standing, and its empirical lawful instantiations, respectively. Leaving here aside
the question of how to understand the passage from (I) to (V),¹⁶ my main concern
in the rest of this essay is to critically discuss a very influential reading of this
problem (although the problem is never quite presented in the way I elucidated
here above). I turn to this influential reading in the next section.
3 A tempting, but ultimately incorrect reading:
projectivism
Here is a possible (but in my view, ultimately, incorrect) solution to the Kantian
problem of inference. Kant might be understood as subscribing to a form of pro-
 I thus depart from Friedman’s influential reading of Kant’s Second Analogy as being tight-
ened with empirical causal laws as constitutive a priori laws. See Friedman, Michael: Causal
Laws and the foundations of natural science. In: The Cambridge Companion to Kant. Ed. Paul
Guyer. Cambridge 1992, 161– 199.
 I have given an answer to this question on Kant’s behalf in Massimi, Michela: Grounds, mo-
dality, and nomic necessity in the Critical Kant. In: Kant and the Laws of Nature. Ed. Michela Mas-
simi, Angela Breitenbach. Cambridge 2017, 150– 170.
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jectivism about laws, like Hume on causation has been read along projectivist
lines.¹⁷A projectivist reading of Kant would have it that the above inference is
neither mysterious nor puzzling. Instead, it can easily be read as the ability of
our mind (in particular of our faculty of understanding) to project the causal con-
nection (licensed by the Second Analogy) between appearances of type A and
appearances of type B onto specific occurrences of A1 and B1. In other words,
we would project our inferential attitudes towards A and B onto nature, and as-
sert that A and B are indeed causally connected (and necessarily so) because our
faculty of understanding takes A and B as causally connected (and necessarily
so). Thus, on this projectivist reading, nature is lawful because the causal struc-
ture of nature (or the order of nature that one may want to call it), would be a
projection of our faculty of understanding (with its principles), without which
nature could not become an object of possible experience for us. Nature cannot
be but lawful, given our cognitive ability of thinking of nature as causally con-
nected in the first instance.¹⁸
An influential projectivist reading of Kant (although not exactly engaging
with what I called the Kantian problem of inference) has also been put forward
by Philip Kitcher.¹⁹ Kitcher’s projectivism is meant to reconcile Kant’s riddle that
the understanding prescribes laws to “nature in general” (but has to resort to ex-
perience to learn “special laws”), with Kant’s other claim that laws of nature are
in some sense necessary. Kitcher argues that we cannot come to know laws of
nature either a priori or from experience (otherwise they would not be necessa-
ry). Hence, Kant needs to give an alternative account, which ultimately resorts to
 See Beebee, Helen: Hume on Causation. The Projectivist Interpretation. In: Causation, Physics
and the constitution of reality. Eds. Huw Price, Richard Corry. Oxford 2007, 224–249.
 For example Juliet Floyd can be read along projectivist lines: “Kant is arguing here that the
Critique of Pure Reason leaves room for a certain form of skepticism, namely the possibility that
the system of empirical laws governing nature might be so complex and heterogeneous that our
faculty of cognition could never place our particular, given experiences into any coherent sys-
tem. […] We may know a priori that every event has some cause or other, as Kant argued in
the Second Analogy of Experience in the first Critique. But this law of appearances in no way
guarantees that we shall be able to determine particular causes of particular events or that
we shall be able to find empirical regularities supporting appropriately predictive generalization
and the explanation of causal relations in particular cases. In the third Critique Kant […] is pre-
paring to formulate not merely a more complex conception of empirical regularity than he had in
the first Critique, but with it a more sophisticated conception of human judgment itself” Floyd,
Juliet: The Fact of Judgment: The Kantian Response to the Humean Condition. In: From Kant to
Davidson: Philosophy and the idea of the Transcencental. Ed. Jeff Malpas. London 2003,
22–47, 26.
 Kitcher, Philip: Projecting the Order of Nature. In: Kant’s Philosophy of Material Nature. Ed.
Robert Butts. Dordrecht 1986, 201–235.
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the “introduction of new pieces of critical machinery”, in particular the principle
of systematic unity as a principle of reason:
Thus we achieve the outline of a Kantian theory about law, causes, and natural necessities.
As the result of the demands of inquiry, demands that are not separable from the naïve sug-
gestion that science aims at the truth, we are prepared to project an order of nature. Laws
are statements that play a particular role in the system that would emerge from an ideally
extended inquiry.²⁰
On this reading, the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic with the principle
of systematicity completes the work of the Second Analogy by distinguishing be-
tween accidentally true universal generalizations and lawlike ones, depending
on whether “they play a particular role in the systematization of belief”.²¹ One
of the motivations for Kitcher’s projectivist reading is that the necessity of the
laws cannot attach to the regularities corresponding to particular laws of nature.
More to the point, Kitcher offers a somehow naturalized analysis of how we
come to have the ability to make causal judgments, not through any explicit
process of systematizing and unifying beliefs. Instead “we absorb from our pred-
ecessors the order of nature that they have projected, so that, from the beginning
of our own discussions of the world of experience, we tacitly operate with claims
about causal dependencies and natural kinds that have been generated by the
systems of our ancestors. Our justifications are thus parasitic on the history of
attempts to construct a systematic unification of human experience”.²²
Much as I am sympathetic with the naturalized reading of Kant that Kitcher
has offered,²³ it is worth noting two salient aspects behind this projectivist read-
ing. First, the projectivist reading seems to be motivated by the perceived lack of
resources internal to Kant’s System of the Principles of Pure Understanding to
square the circle between the necessity of the laws, the apriority of the under-
standing and the input from experience that Kant explicitly admits as key for de-
riving particular laws of nature. Kitcher’s projectivist reading takes as its starting
point a view of laws of nature as capturing regularities that lack the mark of ne-
cessity. Second, since necessity is key to causal judgments and to laws of nature
 Kitcher, Philip: Projecting the Order of Nature. In: Kant’s Philosophy of Material Nature. Ed.
Robert Butts. Dordrecht 1986, 201–235, 214.
 Kitcher, Philip: Projecting the Order of Nature. In: Kant’s Philosophy of Material Nature. Ed.
Robert Butts. Dordrecht 1986, 201–235, 221.
 Kitcher, Philip: Projecting the Order of Nature. In: Kant’s Philosophy of Material Nature. Ed.
Robert Butts. Dordrecht 1986, 201–235, 222.
 I have myself offered a naturalized reading of Kantian kinds elsewhere, see Massimi, Mi-
chela: Natural Kinds and Naturalised Kantianism. In: Noûs 48 (2014), 416–449.
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(as Kant admits), the projectivist reading enjoins us to look for these modal re-
sources outside the System of the Principles (namely, in the faculty of reason
and its principle of systematicity).
I leave here aside the question as to whether textual evidence supports the
first point.²⁴ Instead, it is worth noting that the starting point of the projectivist
interpretation takes laws of nature as akin to Humean regularities and supple-
ments these quasi-Humean regularities with the demand for systematicity (pretty
much as the sophisticated Mill-Ramsey-Lewis view supplements the naïve Hu-
mean regularity theory by invoking a Best System of Lawhood). However, it is
well known that Mill-Ramsey-Lewis regularities too lack the robust necessity
that we tend to associate with laws of nature.²⁵
By the same token, regularities supplemented by the principle of systematic
unity would lack the necessity that Kant sees as key to laws of nature, in my
view. It is a mystery, and certainly one that Kant might have hinted at and
never really explained, how being embedded into a unified system can ever be-
stow necessity upon particular empirical laws. Kant’s discussion of this point in
the First Introduction and the Published Introduction of the third Critique are at
the center of an extensive literature that I cannot even begin to discuss here, be-
cause it will take me far astray from the purpose of this essay. Suffice to say that
a projectivist reading of Kant that appeals to systematicity would need to tell a
story (and a convincing one) as to how nomic necessity can ever be retrieved
from the sheer logical entailment with which one empirical law follows from an-
other one in a best systematized body of knowledge. For the logical entailment of
Newton’s law of gravity from Newton’s second law does not make Newton’s law
of gravity more modally robust than giving a Humean regularity the honorific
title of “law” in virtue of being part of a deductive system.²⁶ Systematicity –
 Kitcher refers to KrV, A 207/B 252, where I take it that Kant is once again stressing how the
Second Analogy provides an a priori template for thinking of alteration of states, for which ex-
perience offers then specific antecedents and consequents in the form of specific moving forces.
Thus, I do not read this passage as forcing upon us a reading of laws of nature as lacking ne-
cessity.
 This is because under the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account, lawhood is ultimately contingent on
the best deductive system in place; the systematization conferred to regularities is, in other
words, epistemic, and does not have a purchase on nature itself. It explains why we regard New-
ton’s three laws as laws in our Best System. But it does not explain why nature conforms to New-
ton’s three laws, and necessarily so.
 Put it differently, systematicity would explain why lawhood is a contingent property: a true
universal generalization such as Newton’s law of gravity might be a law in world w but not in
world z because only w (but not z) provides other true generalizations, which makes it a Best
System. But when we think of Newton’s law of gravity as being necessary, we do not think of
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under the projectivist reading – cannot deliver on the promise of nomic necessity
because it makes it definitionally equivalent to ‘being implied by other laws in a
system’, where the latter cannot explain the former (since it is definitionally
equivalent to it):²⁷
It is nomologically necessary that “All As cause Bs” in world w iff “All As
cause Bs” is implied by other laws in w’s system of knowledge.
This might sound brisk as a dismissal of the projectivist interpretation. More to
the point, there are resources, I argue, within Kant’s System of the Principles to
tackle the pressing issue of the necessity of the laws,without having to outsource
the problem (and its solution) to systematicity in the Appendix to the Transcen-
dental Dialectic and the third Critique. After all, Kant clearly said that it was the
faculty of understanding that prescribes laws to nature, not the faculty of reason
or the faculty of reflective judgment (despite their important role for the lawful-
ness of nature). So, it is within the toolkit of the Transcendental Analytic that we
must look for the resources to answer the quest for nomic necessity. In my view,
there is plenty of evidence in the relevant passages of the Transcendental Ana-
lytic to suggest that Kant did not subscribe to a projectivist interpretation, after
all.
4 Three reasons why projectivism fails as a
reading
Indeed, tempting as it may sound, the projectivist reading fails to capture three
distinctive (epistemic, metaphysical, and semantic) features of Kant’s account of
laws of nature. First, Kant endorses a clear epistemic view that causal knowledge
is a priori: the lawfulness of nature qua nature in general rests a priori on the
Second Analogy of Experience. In other words, our knowledge of premise (I)
in the Kantian inference we saw in Section 2, is a priori. Premise (I) provides
the cause–effect template under which all empirical causal laws stand (although
they are not completely derived from it without the input from experience). On a
it as necessary here on Planet Earth, but not in the Andromeda galaxy, where a different civili-
zation might have a different system of knowledge,with which Newton’s law of gravity might not
fit. In other words, I contend that the lawfulness (understood as a metaphysical feature of why
some regularities are indeed laws of nature) has nothing to do with them being part of a system
of laws.
 For a similar criticism of Lewis’s Best System, see van Fraassen, Bas: Laws and Symmetry.
Oxford 1989, 43–47.
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projectivist reading, cause–effect inferences and causal knowledge, more in gen-
eral, are not a priori, otherwise causal knowledge would reduce to what Kant
calls the “subjective predispositions for thinking, implanted in us along with
our existence by our author in such a way that their use would agree exactly
with the laws of nature along which experience runs”.²⁸
Compare this passage with Kitcher’s aforementioned one: “we absorb from
our predecessors the order of nature that they have projected, so that, from
the beginning of our own discussions of the world of experience, we tacitly op-
erate with claims about causal dependencies and natural kinds that have been
generated by the systems of our ancestors. Our justifications are thus parasitic
on the history of attempts to construct a systematic unification of human expe-
rience”.²⁹
Under the projectivist reading, the lawfulness of nature would be the out-
come of us being predisposed, or hardwired, or able to absorb ‘from our prede-
cessors’ modes of thinking about nature as teaming with causal connections. The
lawfulness of nature would not be the outcome of the understanding prescribing
a priori laws to nature. Kant firmly rejects this epistemic feature of the projectiv-
ist reading and brands it as “a kind of preformation-system of pure reason”
whereby “no end can be seen to how far one might drive the presupposition
of predetermined presuppositions for future judgments”.³⁰ Thus, the projectivist
reading seems to fail on explanatory grounds: we cannot explain why nature is
lawful by simply assuming that we are predisposed (by nature or culture) to
think of it as lawful, any more than we can explain why someone is sleepy by
assuming she has a predisposition to sleep. Kant seems to suggest that unless
we think of cause–effect inferences as a priori (grounded in the Second Analogy
as an priori principle of the understanding, rather than in some subjective pre-
disposition that gets projected onto nature), there is the genuine risk of infinite
epistemic regress in what needs be presupposed as a predisposition for future
judgments. For example, should we discover tomorrow that quantum mechanics
allows for backward causation as some philosophers of physics have been argu-
ing for, we would need to revisit our predispositions for thinking of nature as
obeying asymmetric cause–effect relations, and add a further predisposition
for thinking of nature as obeying instead [(C →E) OR (E →C)].
 Kant: KrV, B 167.
 Kitcher, Philip: Projecting the Order of Nature. In: Kant’s Philosophy of Material Nature. Ed.
Robert Butts. Dordrecht 1986, 201–235, 222.
 Kant: KrV, B 167. – Guyer reads this passage as Kant’s criticism of Hume, although not quite
along the lines of the projectivist reading as I have suggested. See Guyer, Paul: Kant’s Answer to
Hume? In: Philosophical Topics 31/1 (2003), 127– 164, 143.
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But there is more. The projectivist reading falls short of addressing also a sa-
lient and related metaphysical feature of Kant’s account. Causal inferences are a
priori, according to Kant, because the necessary connection between cause and
effect is grounded in the cause. And not just logically grounded, but really
grounded. The necessity of the effects follows from Kant’s distinctive treatment
of causes as real grounds for their effects as I have explained in detail else-
where.³¹ Indeed, in the same aforementioned passage where Kant complains
against the “kind of preformation system of pure reason” Kant goes on to
argue that any such (broadly projectivist) system would rob the categories of the
necessity that is essential to their concept. For, e.g., the concept of cause, which asserts the
necessity of a consequent under a presupposed condition,would be false if it rested only on
a subjective necessity, arbitrarily implanted in us, of combining certain empirical represen-
tations according to such a rule of relation. I would not be able to say that the effect is com-
bined with the cause in the object (i.e. necessarily), but only that I am so constituted that I
cannot think of this representation otherwise than as so connected; which is precisely what
the skeptic wishes most, for then all our insight through the supposed objective validity of
our judgments is nothing but sheer illusion.³²
It is clear from this passage then that the objective necessity of our causal judg-
ments cannot reside in the ability of our mind to combine empirical representa-
tions according to some causal associative rule. Such projectivist strategy of
thinking of appearances as causally connected via natural operations of the
human mind and its “rule of relation” (or what Hume would call “principle of
association”) would only result in a subjective necessity, with no bearing on na-
ture itself. The skeptical outcome of such projectivist move is very remote from
the objective necessity Kant wishes to secure for nomic judgments of causal
kind. Key to objective necessity then is a rejection of the projectivist strategy
and the endorsement of a more robust view whereby positing a cause brings
along with it the necessity of the effect in the object. Such necessity is neither
the projection of natural associative operations of the human mind. Nor is it
due to our being hardwired, or having absorbed our predecessors’ inferential
habits of thinking nature as causally connected. The objective necessity through
which causes bring about their effects “in the object” – as Kant claims – can only
be understood in anti-projectivist terms. It can only be understood if we intro-
duce a metaphysical feature that in my view is pivotal to Kant’s account of the
lawfulness of nature: namely, thinking of causes as real grounds for their effects.
 Massimi, Michela: Grounds, modality, and nomic necessity in the Critical Kant. In: Kant and
the Laws of Nature. Ed. Michela Massimi, Angela Breitenbach. Cambridge 2017, 150–170.
 Kant: KrV, B 168.
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We find Kant making claims to this effect since the pre-Critical writings and in
the context of some of his earliest discussions about the lawfulness of nature.
In the 1763 The Only Possible Argument, where he expressly talks about the
order and harmony of nature as being the product of causal laws:
Something is subsumed under the order of nature if its existence or its alteration is suffi-
ciently grounded in the forces of nature. The first requirement for this is that the force of
nature should be the efficient cause of the thing; the second requirement is that the manner
in which the force of nature is directed to the production of this effect should itself be suf-
ficiently grounded in a rule of the natural laws of causality. Such events are also called,
quite simply, natural events of the world.³³
Laws of nature, especially the “natural laws of causality”, govern nature by fix-
ing the ways in which forces and their effects, qua grounds and determinations,
are related. In 1763, Kant for example referred to gravity as “a cause, which is, of
necessity, sufficient to produce all these effects” (e.g. give the earth its spherical
form, keeps the moon in its orbit, etc.), and uses the terms ‘forces’, ‘causes’, and
‘grounds’ (qua real grounds) interchangeably to motivate an overall account
whereby it is the way in which grounds necessarily bring about their determina-
tions that explains the lawful order of nature.³⁴
Finally, there is a third semantic reason why Kant’s account of laws is non-
projectivist. Under the projectivist reading, we think of events as causally con-
nected (and necessarily so), because we project natural associative operations
of the human mind onto nature, but not because we represent nature as causally
connected (and necessarily so). In other words, causal connection is a matter of
inferential projection rather than semantic representation. And for good reasons
too: namely, because the projectivist account typically lacks the metaphysical
feature I just mentioned, that of thinking of causes as determining their effects
(qua real grounds). Representing nature as causally connected presupposes caus-
es are connected with their effects “in the object”, rather than in some “rule of
relation” in our mind that gets projected onto nature.
Now, Kant fully endorses this anti-projectivist semantic aspect, for he be-
lieves that the lawfulness of nature is down to our ability to represent nature
 Kant: BDG, AA 02: 103.
 “Now, the fact that grounds are to be found in nature for all these effects is, without doubt, a
perfection. And if the same ground which determines the one thing should also be sufficient to
determine the others, then the unity which accrues to the whole is so much the greater”. BDG,
AA 02: 107. I have analyzed this text in relation to the pre-Critical Kant’s view on the lawfulness
of nature in Massimi, Michela: Prescribing Laws to Nature. Part I. Newton, the pre-Critical Kant,
and three problems about the lawfulness of nature. In: Kant-Studien 105/4 (2014), 491–508.
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as causally connected (and necessarily so). And this is where the interesting
transcendental part of Kant’s story comes in. For what we represent are not
things in themselves but appearances, and “appearances are only representa-
tions of things that exist without cognition of what they might be in them-
selves”.³⁵ Thus, we cannot represent real cause–effect connections in nature be-
cause we have no epistemic access to them. Kant does not deny the possibility
that there might be real cause–effect connections in nature (as the causal realist
would maintain). But, even granting that, knowledge of them would be preclud-
ed to us.
That Kant allows for the possibility of real cause–effect connections in na-
ture is clear from his allusion to the “lawfulness of things in themselves” that
“would necessarily pertain to them even without an understanding that cognizes
them”.³⁶ But the lawfulness of things in themselves is inaccessible to us. All we
can have knowledge of are appearances, and appearances – as mere representa-
tions – “stand under no law of connection at all except that which the connect-
ing faculty prescribes”. At this point, Kant’s anti-projectivist transcendental story
becomes fully evident. For Kant contends that
Now that which connects the manifold of sensible intuition is imagination, which depends
on understanding for the unity of its intellectual synthesis and on sensibility for the man-
ifoldness of apprehension. Now since all possible perception depends on the synthesis of
apprehension, but the latter itself, this empirical synthesis, depends on the transcendental
one, thus on the categories, all possible perceptions, hence everything that can ever reach
empirical consciousness, i.e. all appearances of nature, as far as their combination is con-
cerned, stand under the categories, on which nature (considered merely as nature in gen-
eral) depends, as the original ground of its necessary lawfulness (as natura formaliter spec-
tata).³⁷
Thus, we represent events as causally connected because of the way in which our
categories of the understanding perform the transcendental synthesis of the em-
pirical manifold. Via the empirical synthesis of imagination, and subsequently,
via the transcendental synthesis operated by the categories of the understand-
ing, appearances get connected so as to deliver objects of possible experience
(or phenomena). Phenomena are then lawful in being causally connected accord-
ing to the transcendental synthesis operated by the faculty of understanding.
Nature, if regarded from a purely formal point of view (i.e. in terms of the con-
ditions of possibility of knowledge displayed by our faculty of understanding –
 Kant: KrV, B 164.
 Kant: KrV, B 164.
 Kant: KrV, B 165.
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qua natura formaliter spectata) reveals a lawfulness that is inherent in our very
own (transcendental) ways of knowing.
This is Kant’s anti-projectivist transcendental answer to the baffling ques-
tion, which we raised and left open in the previous Sections, namely: how can
nature possibly follow the a priori laws that the understanding prescribe to it?
What purchase can our faculty of understanding possibly have on nature itself?
Kant’s reply is that nature’s lawfulness depends on the faculty of the under-
standing because knowledge of nature is made possible by the principles of
the understanding, which ultimately secure and provide the “original ground”
for nature’s lawfulness. Thus, the lawfulness of nature is not a matter of (para-
doxically) mapping our a priori categories onto nature. Nor is it a matter of pro-
jecting the inferential habits of our mind (acquired by nature or culture) onto na-
ture. Instead, the lawfulness of nature lies at the very heart of our conditions of
possibility of knowing nature, as Kant understood those conditions. Asking why
nature is lawful is not then asking a distinct and secondary question with respect
to the main epistemological question that concerned Kant all along; namely,
how knowledge of nature is possible in the first instance. Instead, it is asking
this very same question in a disguised form. For grasping the lawfulness of na-
ture is grasping the conditions under which nature becomes an object of possible
experience for us.
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